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Abstract. This research note reports on the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys
(CHES), which measure national party positioning on European integration, ideology, and
several European Union (EU) and non-EU policies. The reliability of expert judgments is
examined and the CHES data are cross-validated with data from the Comparative Mani-
festo Project, the 2003 Benoit-Laver expert survey and the 2002 Rohrschneider-Whitefield
survey. The dataset is available on the CHES website.
This research note reports on the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys
(CHES) of the policy and ideological stances of national political parties in
Europe.1 These surveys continue a time series that goes back to 1984. They
reveal, for example, that the weighted average (by vote) of party support for
European integration in the EU-12 was 5.4 (on a seven point scale) in 1984,
peaked at 5.8 in 1992 and fell to 5.2 in 2006.2 In 1984, opposition was primarily
on the economic left; by 2006, opposition became two-sided with the rise of the
populist right. Christian democrats and liberals remain the strongest support-
ers, but they have been joined – and in several countries overtaken – by social
democrats. Conservative parties have become ambivalent. Green parties have
seen the greatest change in position – from mildly Eurosceptic in the 1980s to
mildly supportive in 2006. European integration has become considerably
more salient and more divisive, though there are conjunctural swings and
variation across party families and territory.3
A second focus of the CHES data is to monitor ideological positioning of
political parties on a general left/right dimension and, since 1999, on the
economic left/right and socio-cultural gal/tan (or new politics) dimensions.The
data enable us to track the changing relationship between general left/right
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ideology and party support for European integration over two decades. In
1984, the association was linear (r = 0.30); by 1992 opposition from both the
extreme left and populist right created an inverted U-curve for Western
Europe. In the East, by contrast, Euroscepticism is concentrated in a single set
of left-tan parties.4
The Chapel Hill expert surveys
The 2002 and 2006 surveys extend the Ray dataset for 1984, 1988, 1992 and
1996 (Ray 1999) and the Chapel Hill survey of 1999 (Steenbergen & Marks
2007).5 The 2002 survey was conducted in spring 2003 and covers 171 national
parties in 23 countries. The 2006 survey was conducted in the summer of 2007
and covers 227 national political parties in 29 countries.
The 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys:
• replicate questions from the Ray and the 1999 Chapel Hill datasets on
European integration, issue salience and internal party dissent;
• replicate questions from the 1999 CHES dataset on five EU policies:
cohesion policy, internal market, foreign and security policy, powers of
the European parliament and enlargement;6
• add, for 2006, questions on party positioning and salience for 13 non-EU
policy dimensions surveyed by Benoit & Laver (2006);7 and
• extend country coverage beyond the 14 larger Western EU members in
the Ray and Chapel Hill 1999 datasets to nine post-communist countries
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) in 2002, plus Estonia and five
candidate-EU members (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Serbia and Turkey) in 2006.
The core of the CHES data consists of six items: general party positioning
on European integration; salience of European integration; internal party
dissent on European integration; general party positioning on the left/right
ideological dimension; party positioning on the economic left/right; and party
positioning on the socio-cultural gal/tan.8 Appendix 1 provides question word-
ings for these items.
Reliability
The positions that political parties take on major political issues cannot be
observed directly but can be estimated using either behavioural evidence from
party manifestos, television debates, roll call votes or parliamentary speeches,
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or evaluations by voters, parliamentarians or third-party analysts (Benoit &
Laver 2006). Expert surveys have some virtues that have led social scientists to
use them rather widely, particularly in the study of political parties and public
opinion.When the object of inquiry is complex, it makes sense to rely on the
evaluations of experts – that is, individuals who can access and process diverse
sources of information.
Expert surveys are flexible in two important respects: they do not require
that specific sources of information (e.g., roll call votes, opinion surveys of elite
position, electionmanifestos or elite surveys) be accessible in all cases, and they
are relatively inexpensive to administer. In addition, expert surveys allow the
researcher to use a single format to ask a common set of questions.Whereas roll
call votes, surveys and manifesto tabulations provide data that the researcher
interprets after simplifying the data (e.g., using factor analysis or scaling tech-
niques), expert surveys allow the researcher to design dimensions deductively.
If someone devises a way to measure party policy positions – whether this
is based on content analysis, roll call voting patterns, opinion surveys or
anything else – the first question that arises has to do with the substantive
validity of the measurements being generated. We can assess this infor-
mally by looking at the numbers to see if they seem reasonable, and more
systematically by comparing these with the output of alternative methods
that have set out to measure the same thing for at least some of the cases
in which we are interested.When alternative measures of the ‘same’ thing
conflict, we tend to resort to experts – specialists on the politics of the
country under investigation – who can use their expert knowledge to
adjudicate on the substantive plausibility of what is on offer. There is an
obvious danger that proponents of some particular measure will deploy
expert opinion selectively and rhetorically, citing experts whose views are
sympathetic and ignoring others. The great virtue of an expert survey is
that it sets out to summarize the judgments of the consensus of experts on
the matters at issue, and moreover to do so in a systematic way (Benoit &
Laver 2006: 9; emphases in original).
However, there are potential pitfalls relating to the selection of experts and the
question format (Budge 2006; Marks et al. 2007; Steenbergen & Marks 2007).
With respect to expert selection, some studies rely on one or two carefully
selected experts, while others use a much larger pool (see Tables 1a and 1b).
While it is generally better to have a larger pool of experts, there are instances
where knowledge is limited to a handful of observers or participants, either
because only a few persons are privy to the relevant information (e.g., govern-
ment positions in behind-closed-doors negotiations) or because only a few
the chapel hill expert surveys 689
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persons have the relevant expertise (Dorussen et al. 2005). Gauging the posi-
tioning of political parties demands specialised, but not confidential, knowl-
edge. Political parties are in the business of conveying their positions to mass
publics. The challenge for an expert is to interpret and synthesise signals from
diverse sources: speeches; manifestos; roll call votes; and information reported
in newspapers, television and the Internet. One can usually identify at least a
dozen professional researchers who have published on political parties and/or
European integration in a particular country.9 In 2002, 629 experts were con-
tacted and 39.7 per cent responded. In 2006, 632 experts were contacted with a
response rate of 42.9 per cent.Only Estonia in 2002 did not meet the threshold
of four or more completed questionnaires for inclusion in the dataset.
Respondents were invited to skip questions or parties that were unfamiliar
to them. The questionnaire included the following statement: ‘We would like
you to answer all questions. However, please feel free to skip questions you
cannot answer, and to skip parties that are unfamiliar to you.We would rather
that you return an incomplete questionnaire than no questionnaire at all.’ Our
intention is to diminish the variance of expert judgments on items demanding
specialised knowledge.An average of 9.9 experts answered the six core ques-
tions in 2002, and an average of 8.3 experts answered more specific EU policy
questions; in 2006, the averages were 8.3 for the core six and 7.2 for EU policy.
With respect to question wording, we seek to minimise ambiguity by speci-
fying the actor whose position is evaluated (i.e., the party leadership), the time
frame of the evaluation and the precise content of the political issue in ques-
tion, including the substantive meaning of the extreme values and often of
intermediate values.10 The questionnaires are available on the CHES website.
Unambiguous question wording is necessary but not sufficient for reliable
expert judgments. Perhaps the most important source of error lies neither in
poor question-wording, nor in the selection of experts, but in asking questions
that lie beyond the expertise of respondents. The 2002 Chapel Hill survey
included an item that required experts to evaluate on which of eight particular
European issues political parties were internally divided. The lack of reliable
responses induced us to drop this line of questioning for 2006. It is worth
emphasising that simplicity and economy of the expert survey is a lure as well
as an opportunity. Expert surveys are appropriate only for that subset of topics
where reliable information is not available in documentary sources, but can be
found in the brains of experts.
Estimating reliability
Estimates of party positions are means of expert evaluations. To what extent
are these means reliable summaries? One way to account for the possibility of
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outlying survey responses is to estimate robust means by regressing a continu-
ous variable on dummy variables for groups of interest (Andersen 2008).
Regressing estimates of position, salience and dissent by country on dummy
variables for political party, we find that correlations between these estimates
and simple party means range from 0.97 to 0.99. Convergence of alternative
estimates of group means suggests that they are reliable even in the presence
of outlying responses.
Table 2 summarises standard deviations of expert scores. Large standard
deviations indicate that experts are ‘judging different objects, on different
dimensions, at different points in time’ (Steenbergen &Marks 2007: 351) or, as
noted above, are judging objects for which they have sparse information.
However, the standard deviations reported here are quite small.As one might
expect, experts are most in agreement on the positioning of parties on basic
dimensions of competition: left/right; economic left/right; gal/tan; general posi-
tion on European integration; and positions on non-EU policy dimensions.
They are least in agreement on items that measure more abstract phenomena:
salience of European integration; internal party dissent on European integra-
tion; EU policies; and salience of non-EU policy dimensions. Expert evalua-
tions for political parties inWestern Europe tend to be more reliable than for
political parties in post-communist Europe, though the difference is slight.
Variation in reliability does not cluster significantly by country.11
One can probe error by regressing the standard deviations of expert scores
on factors that might lead to divergence among experts. The estimates for the
six core items in Table 3 suggest that familiarity breeds reliability. Experts
evaluate large parties (party vote), salient issues (issue salience), extreme
parties (party extremism) and Western parties (West) most reliably.12 Party
dissent not only blurs a party in the minds of voters, but makes it more difficult
for experts to identify a party’s stance.
Reliability pertains to random error in the context of repeated measure-
ment, and the errors detected here are reasonably small, structured and intel-
ligible. The fact that error occurs in predictable fashion is useful information
for those who wish to combine datasets to exploit their relative strengths.
Validity
Are the data valid? Do the measures accurately capture what we have in mind
– party positioning on European integration? Are the experts we use appro-
priate witnesses to the phenomenon we seek to capture? These are difficult
questions and, from a philosophical viewpoint, one can never be certain about
the validity of a measure (Goertz 2005; Herrera & Kapur 2007; Munck &
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Verkuilen 2002). A serious concern for an expert survey is that it may be
registering a biased professional consensus.13
Comparing estimates derived from different measures allows one to probe
the existence and sources of bias (Benoit & Laver 2006; Gabel & Huber 2000;
Marks 2007; McDonald et al. 2007).14 The validity of expert survey data on
party positioning has been explored in comparison with data from party mani-
festos, public opinion and surveys of MPs and MEPs. This literature reveals
that evaluations of party positioning provided by academic experts and by
political actors, particularly MPs and MEPs, are highly correlated (Netjes &
Binnema 2007), that evaluations produced by separately conducted expert
surveys are convergent (Whitefield et al. 2007), and that expert surveys are
more consistent with the evaluations of voters and parliamentarians than data
currently available from party manifestos (Marks et al. 2007). A detailed
examination of the reliability and validity of the 1999 Chapel Hill dataset is
consistent with these findings (Steenbergen & Marks 2007).
Comparable data are available only for 2002. For West European parties,
one can compare the CHES dataset with the 2003 Benoit-Laver expert survey
and the Comparative Manifesto Research Group (CMP) dataset.
Chapel Hill expert survey Q1: ‘How would you describe the general
position on European integration that the party’s leadership has taken
over the course of 2002? For each party, please circle the number that
corresponds best to your view,’ scaled from 1 (strongly opposed to Euro-
pean integration) to 7 (strongly in favour of European integration).
The 2003 Benoit-Laver expert survey Q24 – EU:Authority, scaled from 1
(favours increasing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy) to
20 (favours reducing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy).15
The CMP dataset codes the proportion of an electoral manifesto that is
devoted to favourable quasi-sentences referring to European integration
and the proportion devoted to unfavourable quasi-sentences for national
elections held in 2002 or for the national election prior (Budge et al.
2001).16We derive two measures:manifesto ratio, the ratio of positive EU
mentions to the sum of positive and negative EUmentions; andmanifesto
difference, positive minus negative mentions.
Confirmatory factor analysis for 72 political parties common to the CHES,
CMP and Benoit-Laver datasets (Table 4, column 1) reveals that a single factor
explains almost three-quarters of the variance of positioning on European
integration.The standardised loading of the expert survey is 0.99, equivalent to
a true score reliability of 0.97.
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Both the Chapel Hill and Benoit-Laver expert surveys ask experts to
evaluate party positioning on the European Parliament.
Chapel Hill expert survey Q4: ‘Take the position of the party leadership
on the powers of the European Parliament. Some parties want more
powers for the European Parliament. Other parties are opposed to
expanding further the powers of the European Parliament. Where does
the leadership of the following parties stand?’, scaled from 1 (strongly
opposes expanding EU powers) to 7 (strongly favours expanding EU
powers).
Benoit-Laver expert survey Q23: EU accountability, scaled from 1 (pro-
motes the direct accountability of the EU to citizens via institutions such
as the European Parliament) to 20 (promotes the indirect accountability
of the EU to citizens via their own national governments).
The correlation between expert evaluations for the 72 political parties
common to these datasets is 0.87. On this question, 75.5 per cent of the
variance is shared.
How about post-communist Europe? The CMP dataset and the 2002
Rohrschneider-Whitefield expert survey are available for cross-validation on
the general stance of political parties on European integration.17 The CMP and
CHES data are as described above forWestern Europe, and the corresponding
Rohrschneider/Whitefield question is as follows:
Table 4. Cross-validating different measures of party positioning on European integration
West East
Chapel Hill (position) 0.987 0.999
Manifesto ratio (positive/total) 0.600 0.556
Manifesto difference (positive – negative) 0.652 0.575
Benoit-Laver (authority) 0.915
Rohrschneider-Whitefield (political integration) 0.945
Chi2 25.68* 21.79*
Eigenvalue 2.97 2.92
Explained variance 74.3 72.9
Notes: Factor analysis using maximum likelihood. N = 72 (listwise deletion) for the West;
N = 48 (listwise deletion) for the East; unweighted by vote.The 2002 Chapel Hill survey data
are paired with the comparative manifesto data (1999–2003), Benoit-Laver (2003) and
Rohrschneider-Whitefield (2002). The scale for the Benoit-Laver item is reversed. * df = 2,
p < 0.000.
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Rohrschneider/Whitefield Q6: integration with theWest: ‘How about the
EU? Regardless of the specific form that integration may take, where do
parties stand on creating a politically unified Europe?’ scaled from 1
(strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly support).
Confirmatory factor analysis reveals that one factor accounts for slightly more
than 70 per cent of the variance and that the true score reliability of the Chapel
Hill data for post-communist political parties is 0.99 (Table 4).
Both the Chapel Hill and Benoit-Laver surveys have questions on party
positioning on enlargement.
Chapel Hill survey Q11: ‘Consider EU membership for [COUNTRY].
Some parties strongly support major domestic reforms to qualify for EU
membership as soon as possible.Other parties oppose this.Where does the
party leadership of the following parties stand?’, scaled from 1 (strongly
opposes major domestic reforms to qualify for EU membership) to 7
(strongly favours major domestic reforms to qualify for EUmembership).
Benoit-Laver Q4: EU joining, scaled from 1 (opposes joining the EU) to
20 (favours joining the EU).
The association between expert evaluations on this question is 0.87 for 42
common parties, yielding a shared variance of 76 per cent.
These analyses suggest quite high levels of inter-expert reliability and con-
siderable common structure across different measures.The CHES survey pro-
duces information that is in line with alternative sources.There is a reasonable
level of convergence between the CHES data and the manifesto coding data,
a non-expert instrument, though the associations are lower than with expert
surveys. This is consistent with prior research that has shown that manifesto
data and expert surveys tend to have different biases: manifesto data are less
valid for parties with short manifestos or parties with internal dissent, while
expert surveys are less valid at capturing positioning for parties on which
experts disagree (Marks et al. 2006).
Convergence among the datasets cannot rule out the possibility that all
suffer from bias, but bias would have to be shared to produce the common
structure we detect. This is logically possible, but implausible. Comparing lists
of experts in the Rohrschneider/Whitefield survey with those used in the
Chapel Hill survey reveals few common names. Residuals across the datasets
used in the analyses above are weakly correlated with each other (0.3 or less).
There is little evidence that collective professional delusion might have led
experts to misjudge consistently and similarly some parties or party families on
European integration.Expert disagreement – not collusion – appears to be the
greatest source of error.
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Conclusion
The two most recent waves of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey examine national
party positioning on European integration in 23 (2002) and 29 (2006) countries
in the EU and its neighbourhood. We examine the reliability of expert judg-
ments and compare their validity with the Comparative Manifesto data and
the Benoit-Laver and Rohrschneider-Whitefield expert surveys. Consistent
with previous studies, the analysis suggests that the CHES data are a reason-
ably valid and reliable source of information on party positioning on European
integration and ideological positioning. Reliability is rarely uniform across a
dataset. Here it varies by question, country and party. On our website, we
provide individual expert responses by political party. Data collection is an
imperfect enterprise; the purpose of validation is to detect and explain error.
Appendix 1. Question wording for the six core items in the 2002 and
2006 surveys
Item 2002 survey 2006 survey Range
Position on European
integration
Q1: How would you describe the general
position on European integration that
the party’s leadership has taken over
the course of 2002? For each party
row, please circle the number that
corresponds best to your view. Circle
only one number:
1 = strongly opposed to European
integration
2 = opposed to European integration
3 = somewhat opposed to European
integration
4 = neutral to European integration
5 = somewhat in favour of European
integration
6 = in favour of European integration
7 = strongly in favour of European
integration
Q1: How would you describe the general
position on European integration that
the party leadership took over the
course of 2006?
1 = strongly opposed
2 = opposed
3 = somewhat opposed
4 = neutral
5 = somewhat in favour
6 = in favour
7 = strongly in favour
1–7
Salience of European
integration
Q2: We would like you to think about the
salience of European integration. Over
the course of 2002, how important has
the EU been to the parties in their
public stance?
1 = European integration is of no
importance at all
2 = European integration is of little
importance
3 = European integration is of some
importance
4 = European integration is of great
importance
Q2: We would like you to think about the
salience of European integration for a
party. Over the course of 2006, how
important was the EU to the parties
in their public stance?
1 = no importance
2 = little importance
3 = some importance
4 = great importance
1–4
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Appendix 1. Continued.
Item 2002 survey 2006 survey Range
Internal dissent on
European
integration
Q11: How much internal dissent has there
been in the various parties in
[country] over European integration
over the course of 2002? If you
believe that a party is completely
united on European integration,
please circle 1. If you believe it is
extremely divided, please circle 10.
Intermediate numbers reflect the
scale and intensity of disagreement
inside the party.
Q3: What about conflict or dissent within
parties over European integration
over the course of 2006?
0 = party was completely united
. . .
10 = party was completely divided
1–10
(2002)
0–10
(2006)
General
left/right
Q13: We would like you to classify the
parties in terms of their broad
ideology. On the scale below, 0
indicates that a party is at the
extreme left of the ideological
spectrum, 10 indicates that it is at the
extreme right and 5 means that it is
at the centre. For each party, please
circle the ideological position that
best describes the party’s overall
ideology.
0 = extreme left . . .
5 = centre . . .
10 = extreme right
Q10: Please tick the box that best
describes each party’s overall
ideology on a scale ranging from 0
(extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).
0 = extreme left . . .
5 = centre . . .
10 = extreme right
0–10
Economic
left/right
Q14: Political scientists often classify
parties in terms of their ideological
stance on economic issues. Parties to
the right emphasise a reduced
economic role for government. They
want privatization, lower taxes, less
regulation, reduced government
spending and a leaner welfare state.
Parties to the left want government
to play an active role in the economy.
Using these criteria, indicate where
parties are located in terms of their
economic ideology.
0 = extreme left. . .
5 = centre. . .
10 = extreme right
Q11: Parties can be classified in terms of
their stance on economic issues.
Parties on the economic left want
government to play an active role in
the economy. Parties on the
economic right emphasise a reduced
economic role for government:
privatisation, lower taxes, less
regulation, less government spending
and a leaner welfare state.
0 = extreme left . . .
5 = centre . . .
10 = extreme right
0–10
New politics/galtan Q15: Parties may also be classified in
terms of their views on democratic
freedoms and rights. ‘Libertarian’ or
‘postmaterialist’ parties favour
expanded personal freedoms – for
example, access to abortion,
doctor-assisted suicide, same-sex
marriages or greater democratic
participation. ‘Traditional’ or
‘authoritarian’ parties often reject
these ideas; they value order and
stability, and believe that the
government should be a firm moral
authority.Where are parties located
in terms of their ideological views on
freedoms and rights?
0 = libertarian/postmaterialist . . .
5 = centre . . .
10 = traditional/authoritarian
Q12: Parties can be classified in terms of
their views on democratic freedoms
and rights. ‘Libertarian’ or
‘postmaterialist’ parties favour
expanded personal freedoms – for
example, access to abortion, active
euthanasia, same-sex marriage or
greater democratic participation.
‘Traditional’ or ‘authoritarian’
parties often reject these ideas; they
value order, tradition and stability,
and believe that the government
should be a firm moral authority on
social and cultural issues.
0 = libertarian/postmaterialist . . .
5 = centre . . .
10 = traditional/authoritarian
0–10
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Notes
1. The CHES datasets for 2002, 2006 and 1999–2006 are available online at: www.unc.edu/
~hooghe. These surveys were funded by the European Union Center at the University
of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.
2. Included are political parties that obtain at least 2% of the vote in the election imme-
diately prior to the survey year or that elect at least one representative to the national
parliament. A total of 53 parties met this criterion in 1984, 54 in 1992 and 62 in
2006.
3. See, e.g., De Vries and Edwards (2009); Edwards (2009); Manow et al. (2008); Marks &
Wilson (2000).
4. Hooghe et al. (2002) theorise how these ideological dimensions structure party position-
ing on European integration. Marks et al. (2006) explain the structuring of party posi-
tioning in East andWest. Vachudova and Hooghe (2009) examine party competition in
the new Member States.
5. The 2002 survey was sent out by mail and E-mail; the 2006 survey was conducted on the
Web.
6. The 2002 survey includes questions on four additional EU policies: employment, agri-
culture, environment and asylum.
7. These policy dimensions are improving public services versus reducing taxes, deregula-
tion of markets, redistribution from the rich to the poor, civil liberties versus law and
order, lifestyle (e.g., homosexuality), role of religious principles in politics, immigration
policy, integration of immigrants and asylum seekers, urban versus rural interests, cos-
mopolitanism versus nationalism, political decentralisation to regions/localities, Ameri-
can leadership in world affairs, rights for ethnic minorities. Rovny and Edwards (2008)
analyse policy dimensions using CHES data.
8. ‘Gal/tan’ refers to values ranging from GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) to TAN
(traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) (Hooghe et al. 2002).This dimension extends ‘new
politics’ (Franklin 1992) and left/libertarian versus right/authoritarian politics (Kitschelt
1994).
9. Excluding graduate students, party officials and journalists.
10. The general question on European integration reads: ‘How would you describe the
general position on European integration that the party leadership took over the course
of 2006?’, on a seven-point scale ranging 1 (strongly opposed), 2 (opposed), 3 (somewhat
opposed), 4 (neutral), 5 (somewhat in favour), 6 (in favour) and 7 (strongly in favour).
The section on 13 policy dimensions begins: ‘Finally, some questions on where political
parties stood on the following policy dimensions in Austria in 2006. On each dimension,
we ask you to assess the position of the party leadership, and then to assess the
importance/salience of this dimension for a party’s public stance. . . . 13. Position on
improving public services vs. reducing taxes.’ Followed by an 11-point scale with extreme
positions defined as follows: ‘0 = strongly favours improving public services;
10 = strongly favours reducing taxes.’
11. The countries with the highest average standard deviations are: for position, Slovenia in
2006 (0.22); for salience, Belgium in 2002 (0.30), Ireland in 2006 (0.30) and Lithuania in
2006 (0.30); for dissent, Latvia in 2002 (0.35); for general left/right, Bulgaria in 2006
(0.16) and Romania in 2006 (0.16); for economic left/right, Slovakia in 2002 (0.18) and
Austria in 2006 (0.18); for gal/tan, Latvia in 2006 (0.21); for all EU policies pooled,
Ireland in 2002 (0.25) and Romania in 2006 (0.21); for all policy dimensions pooled,
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Latvia in 2006 (0.21). (The policy dimension questions were only asked in the 2006
survey.) Country-specific results are available from the authors upon request.
12. This is consistent with Benoit and Laver’s finding that standard deviations among
experts for post-communist countries are larger (Benoit & Laver 2006: 224).
13. Collective expert bias could result if the professional consensus is wrong, if experts
coordinate evaluations or if the ideological leanings of academic experts affect their
evaluations. Benoit and Laver examine whether experts’ political sympathies affect
party placements on left-right for 387 parties in 47 countries. For seven parties only (all
populist right or conservative-national parties) politically unsympathetic experts were
significantly more likely to give the party a more extreme score than neutral or sympa-
thetic experts (Benoit & Laver 2006: 136–138).
14. In psychometric research this type of analysis is called ‘criterion validity’. Adcock and
Collier (2001; see also Carmines and Zeller 1979) label this ‘convergent validity’. Given
that the indicators used in the factor analyses reported here are measured ordinally, it is
possible that conventional factor analytic techniques are inappropriate. Factor analysis
assumes that observed indicators of the latent construct are measured at the interval
level and it models the relationship among indicators with linear correlations.When we
relax the assumption of linearity and estimate polychoric correlations, this produces
almost identical results.
15. The dataset can be downloaded from: www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/ppmd/.
16. We thank Andrea Volkens for providing the most recent data for this analysis.
17. With thanks to Robert Rohrschneider, who provided the Whitefield-Rohrschneider
dataset. The Benoit-Laver expert survey did not field a comparable question.
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